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Abstract:  
In this paper, we use enterprise level data from the Annual Survey of Industries 
(ASI) to examine the inter-relationships between per capita income, wage rate and 
private investment of the registered manufacturing sector across the Indian states in 
the years of trade and investment liberalization. The study uses cointegration and 
fully modified OLS estimators for a panel of 20 major states spanning the period 
1993-2007. There is evidence of two long-run bidirectional relationships of per 
capita income with wage rate and private investment and a short-run bidirectional 
relationship between the per capita income and per capita private investment. The 
wage rate does not cause the per capita income in the short-run, and it does not 
cause the private investment in both the short and long run. 
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1. Introduction 
Regional imbalance is one of the major hindrances for sustainability of economic growth and 
development of India. The persistence of imbalanced regional growth poses a serious threat 
to economic growth and development and creates economic, social and political tension 
(Chowdhury, 2003; Persson and Tabellin, 1994). India is a mixed, liberalised, federal and 
developing economy. The country is widely diversified socially, politically, economically 
and in terms of availability of natural resources. Private investment is considered as the main 
driver for the rapid growth of the Indian economy, on the one hand. Private investment, on 
the other hand, is also responsible for the increasing disparities in India‘s economic 
development at the sub-national level in the economic reform years (Mallick, 2014; Mallick, 
2013a; Purfield, 2006; Rao et al,1999). Private investment contributes to an economy directly 
by raising national income. It also indirectly contributes to the economy by increasing 
demand for labour, which generates employment opportunities and pushes the price of labour 
and, consequently, increases income and standard of living. It is believed that the introduction 
of various economic reform measures since 1991 has aggravated the competition for 
attracting private investment across the Indian states in a variety of ways. Even, the attraction 
of private investment to generate employment opportunities, scaling up wages and growth 
have become an important part of the political agenda in the recent elections at the national 
and sub-national levels in India.   
The inter-regional growth literature predicts that the inflow of private investment within 
an economy depends on the cost of factor inputs and the rate of return on the investment 
(Calberg, 1981). This means that the inflow of private investment varies inversely with factor 
costs. In this context, the inflow of private investment will be higher in a region with the 
lower cost of labour or wage rate. The inflow of private investment, including foreign direct 
investment (FDI), adopts modern technologies and uses developed managerial skills that 
pushes productivity and wage rate in the developing economies (Mallick, 2017;  Mallick, 
2015a; Mallick, 2015b; Arnal and Hijzen, 2008; Mallick, 2014; Aigbokhan, 2011). The 
‗marginal productivity theory of wages‘ indicates that increase in private investment leads to 
increase in productivity and the wage rate. Hence, the theories predict that there could be a 
simultaneous relationship between the wage rate and the inflow of private investment within 
an economy. The wage rate affects private investment, on one hand and it is affected by 
private investment on the other hand. Similarly, income is expected to have a positive impact 
on the inflow of private investment (Mallick, 2013b), because the states with high income 
may have bigger consumption market, which may lead to increase in prices of products and 
hence profit of the entrepreneurs. The other possible reason is that the high-income states are 
expected to have good quality infrastructure and human capital, which pushes productivity 
and the rate of return on investment. Finally, the wage rate of labour is partly determined by 
the level of income. High income leads to improvement of the standard of leaving, which 
makes the wage rate higher than that of the states with lower income. On the other hand, 
wage inequality is one of the main causes of rising income disparity as well (Herr and Ruoff, 
2014). The wage differential is a vital source of divergence in India and has a very relevant 
role in Indian economic policy to reduce income disparity (Marjit and Mitra, 1996; Das, 
2002). 
The existing studies on the disparity in economic development during the economic 
reform years in the context of the Indian economy have concentrated on identifying the 
factors of disparity in wages, income and private investment (Mallick, 2014; Mallick, 2013b, 
Mallick, 2012a; Mallick, 2011; Das, 2002; Ramaswamy, 2008; Purfield, 2006; Dholkia, 
1976; Papola, 1972; Rao et al,1999; Amiri, 2011). The study by Mallick (2014) examines the 
impact of the disparity in private investment on the disparity in income across the Indian 
states during the economic reform years. Mallick (2013b) establishes income as one of the 
crucial factors for the disparity in private investment across the Indian states. Some of the 
studies have limitations in the measurement of private investment. For instance, Baddeley et 
al., (2006), Rao et al. (1999) and Purfield (2006) examined the impact of investment on state 
level economic growth. However, due to the unavailability of data on investment, they used 
proxies, which are poor reflections of the extent of private investment and public investment 
at the state level because they exclude loans extended by various non-financial institutions to 
private enterprises, foreign investors in the states and public investment as a part of public 
expenditure. Some other studies dealt with the disparity in wage rates across various sub-
sectors of manufacturing industries (Amiri, 2011; Ramaswamy, 2008; Purfield, 2006; 
Dholkia, 1976; Papola, 1972) and across the Indian states as well (Das, 2002). Amiri (2011) 
and Ramaswamy (2008) noted that wage disparity increased during the economic reform 
years. The liberalization measures in the 1990s widened the disparity between skilled and 
less-skilled workers due to higher international trade, import of skill-based technologies, 
changes (SBTC) and increase in investment including FDI. The growth of wage rate for 
skilled labour was considerably higher than that of the unskilled category during the reform 
years, which created substantial wage disparities between them across various occupations
1
. 
Further, a large number of studies have also established that wage differentials are due to the 
differences in technical skills and level of education (Dickens and Katz, 1986; Holzer, et al., 
1988; Katz and Summers, 1988; Katz and Murphy, 1991; Krueger and Summers, 1986; 
Krugman, 1994; Lowe, 1995; Murphy, et al., 1998; and Virén, 2005) and the higher returns 
to high-skilled workers (Borjas et al., 1992; Glaeser and Mare, 2001; Wheaton and Lewis, 
2002), along with the globalisation and polarisation of the labour market. Autor et al., (1998, 
2003, 2006), Goldin and Katz (2008), Card (2002) and Acemo-Glu (1998) emphasised on 
SBTC as the cause of wage disparity and, thus, income inequality.  
However, there is no empirical evidence, which establishes the above simultaneous 
relationship between income, private investment and wages in the context of Indian states. 
Private investment and wage rate were crucial for the rising income disparity across the 
Indian states during the economic reforms period. It is policy imperative to understand how 
they are inter-related to each other in both the short and long run. Hence, a detailed study on 
the causal relationship of disparity in private investment, income and wage is required to 
design policies to achieve balanced regional growth and sustain high national economic 
growth in India. Against this background, the purpose of this paper is to investigate 
empirically the relationship between income, private investment and wage rate in the major 
Indian states during the period of economic reforms. The study considers the manufacturing 
sector (registered) as the major contributor to private investment and national income in 
India‘s industrial sector. The study considers 20 major states, viz., Andhra Pradesh, Assam, 
Bihar, Chhatisgarh, Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, 
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar 
Pradesh, Uttaranchal and West Bengal during the period from 1993-94 to 2007-08 for the 
empirical verification. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the regional 
disparity in private investment, wage rate and income is discussed. Section 3 comprises data 
sources and outlines the technique of estimation. Section 4 presents the main findings. 
Finally, Section 5 summarises and discusses policy implications of the findings. 
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Administrative and professional workers are generally considered as skilled labour as they have school and college 
education. They are the highest paid workers. In contrast, the unskilled workers include the labourers and production 
workers as they have no higher education, and are lowest paid (Amiri, 2011). 
2. Data  
The variables included in the empirical analysis are per capita income, wage rate and per 
capita private investment of the registered manufacturing sector across 20 major states from 
1993-94 to 2007-08. The Central Statistical Organization (CSO) of India is the basic database 
of this study. The per capita income is measured as the per capita Gross State Domestic 
Product (GSDP). The GSDP of the registered manufacturing sector is used at the constant 
prices (1999-2000) from the CSO database. The wage rate or labour cost (LC) is measured as 
the as the average wage (= total emoluments/ total number of employees), which is used in 
the empirical studies (Sidhu, 2008). The nominal series on wage rate is taken from the plant 
level record of the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). The series is converted into real prices 
at 1999-00 base by using the GSDP deflator of the registered manufacturing sector of CSO 
data. 
Private investment is represented by the gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). The 
measurement of state level private investment is a challenging task in developing countries 
like India
2
. The study utilises the enterprise records of the ASI and the aggregate data of 
National Accounts Statistics (NAS) to generate a series on the state level private investment 
of the registered manufacturing sector. The NAS provides data on GFCF at the both current 
and constant prices with base year 1999-00 by industry of use. The NAS gives data on GFCF 
for the entire economy and the public sector by industry of use, including the 1-digit industry 
code of the National Industrial Code (NIC). The entire manufacturing industry includes the 
un-registered and registered sectors. Private investment in the registered manufacturing 
industry is what is remaining after deducting public GFCF from the total GFCF in this sector. 
The enterprise level data of ASI provides annual data on GFCF in the registered 
manufacturing industries by the types of institutions at the current prices. Hence, the national 
private GFCF in the registered manufacturing sector is distributed among the states on the 
basis of plant level data for private enterprises to estimate the private investment in this sector 
in 20 major states from 1993–94 to 2007–08 (for the detailed methodology, see Appendix 
A1). These estimates are used to measure the state level per capita private investment (PRI). 
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The measurement of private investment at the state level in India is thoroughly discussed in Mallick (2014), Mallick 
(2013a), Mallick (2013b), Mallick (2012a), Mallick (2012b) and Mallick (2008). 
3. Empirical Strategy 
The variables are converted into their natural logarithms to achieve stationarity in variance.  
The panel data method is used to investigate the cointegrating relations and short-run 
causality among ln. per capita income (LGSDP), ln. wage rate (LLC) and ln. per capita 
private investment (LPRI). In brief, the empirical investigation involves three steps, viz. (1) 
panel unit root testing to determine the order of integration of the variables, (2) employing 
panel cointegration tests to examine the long-run relationships among the variables, and (3) 
applying dynamic panel causality tests to evaluate the short-run cointegration and the 
direction of causality among variables. In addition, the study uses panel fully modified OLS 
procedures (FMOLS) model to examine the long-run impact.  
Panel data provide a larger number of point data, increasing the degrees of freedom 
and reducing the collinearity between regressors. Hence, panel data allows powerful 
statistical tests, which test statistics follow normal distribution. Further, the literature suggest 
that panel based unit root tests have higher power than unit root tests on individual time 
series. The recently developed panel unit root tests, which are commonly used in economic 
analyses are Levin, Lil and Chu (2002), Breitung (2000), and IPS or Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003), Maddala and Wu (1999), Choi (2001) and Hadri (2000).  
After identifying the integrated order of the variables in the analysis, the cointegartion 
test is conducted. The most popular panel cointegration tests applied in recent literature are 
Pedroni (1999), Pedroni (2004), Kao (1999) and a Fisher-type test using an underlying 
Johansen methodology (Maddala and Wu, 1999). The Pedroni and Kao Tests are based on 
Engle-Granger (1987) two-step (residual-based) cointegration tests. In our analysis, we 
employ three kinds of panel cointegration tests: Pedroni‘s (2004), Kao‘s (1999), and 
Johansen‘s (1988) Fisher panel cointegration tests. These cointegration tests only indicate 
whether or not the variables are cointegrated or whether a long-run relationship exists 
between them. Since they do not indicate the direction of causality, we estimate the long and 
short-run relationships by using panel FMOLS and Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
proposed by Engle and Granger (1987), respectively. The VECM is used to conduct the 
granger causality tests for short run relationships. The long-run impact of each variable is 
estimated using panel FMOLS developed by Pedroni (2000). 
 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
The above data have been used to describe the trends of per capita income, wage rate and 
private investment of the manufacturing sector across 20 major states in Figure 1. The figure 
shows a rising trend in wage rate along with per capita income and per capita private 
investment across the Indian states during the period of economic reforms. This means that 
there is a positive relationship between per capita income, wage rate and per capita private 
investment across the Indian states. Further, the regional disparity in per capita income, wage 
rate and per capita private investment is measured by the standard deviation across the states. 
The trends in the regional disparity are presented in Figure 2, which shows that the rising 
trends in regional disparity in income is associated with the rising trend in disparity in wage 
rate and per capita private investment from 1993 to 2007. Therefore, there is positive 
relationship between regional disparities in per capita income, wage rate and per capita 
private investment across the Indian states. 
 Figure1:  per capita income, wage rate and per capita private investment  
 
Note: LC (10): annual wage rate in 10 units; GSDP and PRI are per capita income and private investment. It is in terms of 
average of 20 states (for detailed data, see Table A2 in appendices).              
Sources: Unit levels data of Annual Survey of Industries, Government of India 
Figure 2: Inequality in income, wage rate and private investment 
 
Sources: As in figure 1. 
In the line with the above patterns in the manufacturing sector, the studies dealing 
with the entire economy at the state level in India also find rising disparities in income and 
private investment. This rising disparity in aggregate income is explained by a large number 
of studies (Ahluwalia, 2002; Dasgupta et al., 2000; Kurian, 2000; Mallick, 2014; Marjit and 
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Mitra, 1996; Purfield, 2006; Rao et al., 1999). The main reasons for such rising disparity are 
the rich and faster-growing states have had higher success in generating jobs in the private 
sector and attracting capital, the economic growth of the richer and faster growing states is 
more stable than that of the poor states and the differences in economic policies across the 
regions (Purfield, 2006).  
Rao et al., (1999) lay emphasis on the differences in infrastructure and human 
resources for causing such regional divergence in the post-reform era because they have an 
edge in attracting investment. Specifically, private investment is more important than public 
investment in spurring economic growth and development in developing countries. Private 
investment is more productive than the public investment (Khan and Kumar, 1997; Khan and 
Reinhart, 1990; Mallick, 2013a; Mallick, 2014). Hence, the disparity in private investment 
contributed to the rising disparity in economic growth and development in Indian states in the 
reform years (Kurian, 2000; Ahluwalia, 2002; Mallick, 2014). However, Mallick (2013b) 
provided evidence to show that income disparity is one of the reasons for the high disparity in 
private investment because the high-income states are expected to have good quality 
infrastructure and human capital, which pushes productivity and, hence, the rate of returns on 
investment. The high-income states have better social and demographic characters and higher 
per capita resources along with infrastructure, which are vital to attract private investment 
(Kurian, 2000).  
The differential wage rates are identified as the vital sources of divergence in India, 
which is against of validity of Samuelson‘s factor price equalization theorem (Marjit and 
Mitra, 1996). In general, labour heterogeneity, with respect to skill, heterogeneous nature of 
industrial structure and administration rules across the states, widens the wage gap in India. 
The rising wage gap in the manufacturing sector is due to skilled labour (Ramaswamy, 2008; 
Amiri, 2011). The skilled workers‘ share in total employment has been increasing in India 
during the period of liberalization and globalization, which is accompanied by an increase in 
relative wages of skilled labour. It indicates a shift in the aggregate demand in favor of 
skilled workers, which could be due to the rise of multinational investment and domestic 
private investment. The economic liberalization of the 1990s gave Indian industries greater 
access to the international markets, capital goods and technology
3
. It provided incentives for 
increasing production, upgrading technologies and modernizing industries. In turn, the 
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India liberalized trade and foreign investment policies as measures of economic reform in 1991, which focused on the 
reduction of tariffs, the elimination of the licensing regime, the abolition of non-tariff barriers on imports, the removal 
of trade monopolies and the simplification of the trading regime and administration procedures. 
demand for highly skilled labour increased and led to an increase in economic activities and 
skill-wages. On the other hand, less-skilled workers were adversely affected. Low demand 
weakened their bargaining power and led to growing wage inequality.  
 The globalization and the polarization of the labour market into high and low-skill jobs 
also enhanced wage disparity. Due to globalization, manufacturing activities were shifted to 
the countries with lower wages, like India and China. The employment of new technologies 
increased productivity and efficiency on the one hand and on the other hand, it eliminated 
millions of formerly low-skill but high-paying jobs. The developed cities had distinct 
advantages in terms of attracting high-skilled labour, high-technology jobs and other 
economic assets in the era of globalization and that led to the locational divergence of high 
skilled workers (Florida, 2002; Berry and Glaeser, 2005). Further, the distribution of skills 
varies across the types of regions, with higher wage analytical skills being concentrated in the 
developed regions, and lower-wage physical skills concentrated in less developed regions 
(Bacoldet al., 2009; Florida et al., 2011). Glaeser et al,. (2009) noted that, even the inequality 
could be explained by the clustering of more and less skilled people in particular locations 
(Glaeser et al., 2009)
4
.  
 From the above discussion, it is not possible to establish the cause and effect 
relationship between private investment, income and wage rate. Hence, this section presents 
the estimated results of the causality relations between LGSDP, LLC and LPRI.  The 
descriptive statistics of these variables are presented in Table A3 of appendices. To test the 
nature of their association, the empirical investigation in this paper begins by testing 
stationarity property of the variables and then tests for panel cointegration by using methods 
developed by Pedroni (1995, 1999). Given the long-run equilibrium relationships, we explore 
the causal link between the different pairs of variables by testing for Granger causality 
through Vector Error Correction (VEC) regressions. In addition, we estimate Panel FMOLS 
regressions in order to highlight the effect of wage disparity on the disparity in income and 
private investment at the state level. The detailed results are explained below. 
4.1. Panel Unit Root Tests 
The analysis of the dataset is started by testing the statistical properties of the time series by 
using panel unit root tests. The determining of the time-series properties of the variables is an 
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For instance, there is increase in wage inequality in urban India over the period 1983-99 due to the increase in the 
returns on skills, which is itself a consequence of increases in the demand for skilled labour (Kijima, 2005).  
Similarly, Rubiana (2006) argues that relative demand shifts contributed to relative wage shifts across gender and skill 
upgrading within industries increases the demand for skilled labor. 
important step, as the presence of non-stationary regressors invalidates many standard 
hypotheses tests (Granger and Newbold, 1974). The stationarity of variables is investigated 
by the Breitung test, Levin, Lil and Chu test, IPS test, Fisher-type tests using Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Philips-Perron (PP), and Hadri tests. The tests have been computed 
under three different specifications, represented by the inclusion of individual effects, 
individual effects and linear trends and none as reported in Table 1. The Levin, Lil and Chu, 
Breitung and Hadri tests assume that there is a common unit root process (Levin et. al. 2002; 
Breitung, 2000). The Levin, Lil and Chu, and Breitung tests employ the null hypothesis of 
common unit root while the Hadri test uses a null of no common unit root. The null 
hypothesis of the individual unit root process is verified by IPS and Fisher tests of ADF and 
PP (Im et al., 2003; Maddala and Wu, 1999). The first four columns report the panel unit-
root statistics for the variables at the level. The majority of the tests with various 
combinations of three types of specification do not reject the hypothesis of unit roots for all 
the four variables. For instance, only five out of 14 combinations of tests and specifications 
reject the unit-root hypothesis for LGSDP, whereas the remaining shows the presence of unit 
root. Hence, the decision is the presence of unit root for LGSDP at the level. The panel unit 
roots results suggest that the variables at level are not stationary and thus any causal 
inferences from the series at level give spurious results.   
Table 1: Panel Unit Root Test 
Variables LGSDP LLC LPRI D(LGDP) D(LLC) D(LPRI) 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects and individual linear trends 
Levin, Lin & Chu  -4.04* 1.14 -2.53* -10.86* -0.90 -14.88* 
Breitung -0.98 -0.19 -3.16* -5.71* 5.84 -9.47* 
Im, Pesaran and Shin   -2.2** -2.96* -1.44 -7.43* -2.90* -10.58* 
ADF - Fisher  64.93** 62.66** 50.15 121.92* 77.29* 163.03* 
PP - Fisher  57.62** 41.36 44.90 160.66* 90.93* 206.73* 
Hadri z-stat 6.90* 4.54* 5.53* 6.9* 4.99* 4.22* 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects only 
Levin, Lin & Chu  0.82 3.05 1.19 -11.65* -4.52* -18.10* 
Im, Pesaran and Shin   2.82 3.79 1.69 -9.73* -7.70* -14.51* 
ADF - Fisher  32.71 24.48 26.72 158.89* 133.25* 227.051* 
PP - Fisher  36.60 21.36 23.49 178.96* 139.74* 264.57* 
Hadri z-stat 10.12* 11.33* 8.73* 10.12* -0.19 0.29 
Exogenous variables: None 
Levin, Lin & Chu 8.73 8.09 4.85 -8.55* -11.40* -16.70* 
ADF - Fisher  4.15 2.24 4.00 212.07* 166.24* 263.51* 
PP - Fisher  6.16 1.52 3.32 225.12* 180.90* 304.96* 
Note: * significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level at 10% level. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-
West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel. Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi-square 
distribution. Probabilities for Hadri test is computed using Z distribution.  
Source: Author‘s calculation using EViews 8. 
The last three columns report the panel unit-root statistics for the first differences of 
each variable. Similarly, the table shows that the majority of the test statistics indicate 
rejection of the null of non-stationarity for all variables. It may, therefore, be concluded that 
all the variables are unit-root variables of order 1 or integrated of order 1. 
4.2. Panel Cointegration Analysis 
Having found that all variables under consideration are of I (1) process, we then proceed to 
test whether a long-run relationship exists between them. Pedroni‘s within and between 
dimension results of the panel cointegration tests and Kao‘s panel cointegration test results 
under the three different specifications are presented in Table 2. Two of the four panel test 
statistics and two of the three group test statistics along with Kao‘s (1999) test statistics 
suggest that there is a panel cointegration. Hence, the majority of the test statistics indicates 
the existence of panel cointegration in all the three specifications among the set of variables. 
The group Phillips and Perron (1988) statistic, and the group Dickey and Fuller (1979) ADF 
type t-statistic are statistically significant at 1 per cent. According to Pedroni (2004), the 
Phillips and Perron (1988) type rho and t-statistics tend to under-reject the null in the case of 
small samples. Thus, given that two of the three tests suggest panel cointegration in most 
cases, it is reasonable to conclude that all variable sets are cointegrated. In sum, there is 
strong statistical evidence in favour of panel cointegration; hence, there may be long-run 
relationships between the variables under consideration. 
Table 2: Pedroni and Kao Panel cointegration tests results 
Tests 
Trend assumption: No 
deterministic trend 
Trend assumption: Deterministic 
intercept and trend 
Trend assumption: No deterministic 
intercept and or trend 
Statistics  
Weighted 
statistics Statistics  Weighted statistics Statistics  Weighted statistics 
Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test: 
Panel v-Statistic 0.42 0.11 -0.55 0.42 0.86 0.49 
Panel rho-Statistic -0.73 -0.66 1.04 0.80 -0.35 -0.45 
Panel pp-Statistic -3.61* -3.89* -3.56* -4.83* -2.35* -2.31* 
Panel ADF-Statistic -4.23* -4.47* -3.58* -4.85* -2.76* -2.69* 
Group rho-Statistic 0.56  2.67  0.28  
Group  pp-Statistic -4.89*  -5.06*  -4.25*  
Group ADF-Statistic -5.28*  -4.07*  -5.19*  
Kao Residual Cointegration Test: 
ADF-t Statistic -4.99* 
Note: * significant at 1% level. Automatic selection of lags based on SIC. Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection using 
Bartlett kernel.   
Source: Author‘s calculation using EViews 8. 
In addition, Kao‘s (1999) residual panel cointegration tests reject the null of no 
cointegration at 1 per cent significance level. Further, in order to confirm the test results of 
these two tests, we then use Johansen‘s approach, which enables us to determine the number 
of cointegrating vectors as well. The optimal lag length is chosen based on Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) in Johansen‘s 
(1988) Fisher panel Cointegration test. The results suggest that there are two conintegrating 
vectors, which are statically significant at 1 per cent (see Table A4 in appendix).   
4.3. Long-run Impact and Causality 
The cointegrating relationships between the variables allow estimatiion of the long-run 
impact on each other. However, the presence of panel cointegrations makes the OLS 
estimators biased and inconsistent. Hence, this study utilises the panel FMOLS estimator
5
, 
which not only takes into account the problem of endogeneity of the regressors but also the 
serial correlation in the error term (Fayissa and Nsiah, 2013). Recently, several studies have 
used panel FMOLS, such as Ouedraogo (2013) and Liddle (2012). The three models are 
estimated for the three variables and their results are presented in Table 3.  
Model 1 estimates the effect of disparity in wage rate and private investment on per 
capita income. The estimated regression coefficients are strongly significant at 1 per cent 
level with the expected signs. The estimated coefficients of LLC and LPRI are 0.61 and 0.13, 
respectively. These results submit that the labour market is crucial for the increasing regional 
disparity in the long run income as argued by Marjit and Mitra (1996). The differential in 
wage rate could be due to the heterogeneous element of industrial structure and 
administration rules, which causes regional divergence across the Indian states (Marjit and 
Mitra, 1996). Specifically for the manufacturing sector, the labour market is crucial for the 
regional disparity in Indian states following the liberalisation measures, including de-
licensing, in India (Aghion et al., 2005). Similarly, Model 2 provides the result that LGSDP 
and LPRI are significant for the regional disparity in wage rate. As expected income and 
private investment affect wage rate positively. Finally, Model 3 shows that the coefficient of 
LGSDP is only strongly and positively significant in explaining the disparity in LPRI. 
Therefore, in the long-run, the bidirectional causality run between income and wage rate and 
between income and private investment. However, the inflow of private investment positively 
affects wage rate across the Indian states. The finding is in line with the two famous 
hypothesis, i.e, ‗ability to pay‘ and ‗technology‘ as evidenced by Dholkia (1976) and Papola 
(1972) in the case of the manufacturing sector in India. According to the ‗ability to pay‘ 
hypothesis, the wage rate is determined by labour productivity. In a competitive market 
condition, the wage rate is equal to the marginal product of labour. The inflow of private 
investment raises labour productivity, which pushes the wage rate. Similarly, as per the 
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Panel FMOLS is used because of a small sample of the study. The FMOLS has relatively lower small sample distortions 
(Pedroni, 2001; Ouedraogo, 2013) and more flexibility in terms of hypothesis testing (Basher and Mohsin 2004).  
technology hypothesis, the adoption of improved technology or upgradation of the existing 
machinery demands more skilled workers and supervisors. This necessitates provision of 
training to the existing workers and the recruitment of more skilled workers and supervisors. 
Experienced and skilled labour is available at higher payment rates in the competitive labour 
markets. The adoption of advanced technology raises labour productivity. Consequently, 
wage rates would go up. In this context, FDI is more technology intensive than that of 
domestic counterparts in developing countries. Hence, foreign owners pay higher wages than 
local firms do in the emerging economies (Arnal and Hijzen, 2008; Viren, 2005). However, 
labour cost is not significant in determining the inflow of private investment across the Indian 
states in the long-run. The inflow of private investment is driven by labour productivity, as 
noted by Mallick (2013b). The findings suggest that the labour market is responsible for the 
disparity in economic development and significantly beneficial to the inflow of private 
investment in the long-run.  
Table3: Panel Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS) Estimates 
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
LGSDP LLC LPRI 
LGSDP  0.65* 2.67* 
LLC 0.61*  0.29 
LPRI 0.13* 0.08**  
Note: * and ** denote significant at 1 % and 5 % level of significance, respectively. 
The causal relationship is now examined more thoroughly with the use of panel 
VECM estimators. Defining the lagged residuals from the estimated long-run cointegration 
equations, the dynamic error correction models are estimated
6
. The optimal two-year lag 
structure is chosen, using SIC and AIC criteria. By focusing on the purpose of the study, the 
short-run causality is examined using the Granger causality test based on the specified 
VECM. This test takes into account the joint effect or the significance of both the one-year 
and two-year lagged variables. The result is presented in Table 4, which indicates that in the 
short-run there are two unidirectional causalities and one bidirectional causality in this system 
of equations. The change in the per capita income immediately affects wage rate 
significantly. However, the change in wage rate does not cause income disparity in the short-
run. The inflow of private investment causes income disparity in the short-run, and hence the 
wage rate. The inflow of private investment raises the demand for labour, which pushes the 
wage rate. Finally, private investment is caused by the income in the short-run. As mentioned 
earlier, the states with higher income are expected have a sound consumer market, better 
                                                          
6 Details of the results on the PVEC estimation are available from author. 
human capital and better quality of infrastructure, which maximises profit and rate of return 
on investment. Nevertheless, wage does not cause inflow of private investment. It could be 
due to the significance of labour efficiency or productivity raising the rate of return of firms 
as evidenced in the context of Indian states (Mallick, 2013b). Further, Noorbakhsh et al., 
(1999) noted that skilled labour is significant in determining the inflow of FDI into 
developing countries, because FDI is shifting towards the knowledge and skill-intensive 
manufacturing sector. This shift is also taking place across the broad groups and again within 
the same group of manufacturing industries. Given the locational factors along with 
minimum levels of skills, the comparative advantage of low labour costs may still matter, but 
only in a handful of low technology activities. In this context, it can be stated that the 
significance of skilled labour or productivity depends on the structure of the industries. This 
finding confirms that the labour market is crucial and significantly beneficial to the inflow of 
private investment in the short-run as well. In turn, it affects the per capita income across the 
Indian states. 
Table 4: PVEC Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Excluded Variables D(LGSDP) D(LLC) D(PRI) 
D(LGSDP)  37.74* 8.20** 
D(LLC) 1.63  3.15 
D(PRI) 39.21*  18.66 *  
All 44.73* 65.84 * 9.30**  
      Note: The values in the table are the chi-square values. The values *, ** and *** represent the statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
The above mentioned short-run relations have been estimated through the impulse-
response functions (IRF) based on the panel VECM specification. The system is perturbed 
by a one-time unit shock on each of the variables to analyse how the shock changes the 
time path of the variables. Point estimates of the impulse responses and their corresponding 
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Fig 3. Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations
90 per cent confidence intervals are calculated for a time horizon of 10 years. The results of 
the impulse response analysis for the above four significant relationships are presented in 
Figure 3. The figure indicates that one standard deviation change in income positively 
affects the inflow of private investment for the initial two years. The positive shock to 
private investment has sudden positive impact on income and wage rate. Further, the 
positive shock to income is associated with the increase in private investment.  
Variance decompositions (VDC) 
In this section, we use the Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) as an analytical 
tool to assess the relative importance of the shocks of variable in explaining fluctuations of 
other variables in the system. While impulse-response functions provide information on the 
size and speed of target variable due to shocks on other variables in the system, they do not 
give information on the importance of shocks on the variance of target variable on the other 
variables. We have analysed the variance decomposition, which indicates how much of 
forecast error variance of each variable can be explained by exogenous shocks (changes) to 
the variables in the panel VECM model
7
. The FEVD results are presented in Table 5 over 
forecast horizons of six years.  
Table 5.Variance Decompositions analysis 
Period S.E. LGSDP LPRI LLC 
Proportions of forecast error in LGSDP accounted for by 
1  0.67  100.00  0.00  0.00 
2  0.81  66.13  18.88  14.99 
3  0.84  61.52  19.47  19.01 
4  0.88  58.33  25.65  17.02 
5  0.89  55.69  25.30  17.00 
6  0.91  52.24  28.15  16.21 
Proportions of forecast error in LPRI accounted for by 
1  1.08  7.43  92.56  0.00 
2  1.28  17.01  72.07  03.92 
3  1.34  20.22  67.60  12.18 
4  1.48  24.97  59.13  15.89 
5  1.52  27.66  55.66  16.67 
6  1.63  30.28  53.49  16.22 
Proportions of forecast error in LLC accounted for by 
1  0.28  6.59  3.33  90.08 
2  0.33  15.04  9.02  75.95 
3  0.35  16.03  13.16  70.80 
4  0.36  18.02  17.20  64.78 
5  0.38  18.19  20.93  60.87 
6  0.39  19.82  22.10  58.08 
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The FEVD measures the fraction of the s-step ahead of forecast error variance (FEV) of an endogenous variable due 
to the innovations or structural shocks to itself or to another endogenous variable in the system (Lutkepohl, 2005; 
Ewing et al., 2007). That means it decomposes the FEV into the components accounted due to shocks in the different 
endogenous variables (Lutkepohl, 2005; Ewing et al., 2007). 
Table 5 shows the contribution of the FEV explained by a LGSDP shock on the 
relevant variables in the system. It is evident in the first year that LGSDP itself explains 100 
per cent of forecast error in its own value and it explains the largest proportion of forecast 
error throughout the period of six years. However, the explanatory power of LLC and LPRI 
has increased in this duration. By the end of six years, wage rate and private investment are 
emerged to explain the variance of LGSDP by 16 and 28 per cent, respectively. The analysis 
finds that the larger proportion of forecast error variance in LPRI is explained by its own 
value whereas LGSDP explains around 7 per cent of the forecast error variance in the first 
year. As the time horizon moves on, the explanatory power of LGSDP increases and they 
explain 30 per cent by the end of six years. Similarly, in the first year the forecast error 
variance of LLC is explained mainly by its own shock. However, as the time progresses until 
six years, variance due to its own shock goes down to 62 per cent, and variance due to 
LGSDP and LPRI increases to 20 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively.  
In brief, in the long-run, the regional wage disparity has bidirectional causality with 
the disparity in income across the Indian states during the period of liberalisation. In addition, 
private investment is crucial in this rising disparity in wage rate and income across the states 
in the long-run. Pertaining to short-run causality, there is bidirectional causality between 
private investment and income. Wage disparity is caused by disparity in income and private 
investment because the inflow of private investment demands skilled labour and it raises 
wage rate. Similarly, as income increases, consumption demand increases and that requires 
increase in production. In turn, it demands for skilled labour by increasing wage rate. 
However, the wage rate in the short-run does not cause the private investment and income, 
either.  
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This study investigates causal relationships between per capita income, per capita private 
investment and wage rate in the registered manufacturing sector across the Indian states 
during the period of liberalization. The preliminary analysis suggests that there is an 
increasing trend in the regional disparity of per capita income, per capita private investment 
and wage rate across the 20 major states. The study uses the panel data method for the 
empirical analysis to establish the cause and effect relationships during the period in 1993-94 
to 2007-08. The unit root test shows that all the variables are integrated of Order 1, which 
allowed the test for cointegration. The residual cointegration test of Pedroni and Kao suggests 
the existence of long-run equilibrium relations, which is again confirmed through the 
Johansen Fisher panel test by identifying two cointegrating vectors. Then, the long-run 
effects of each variable are examined by panel FMOLS method. The results show that the 
long-run disparity in income is explained by wage rate and private investment while the long-
run disparity in wage rate is explained by income and private investment and the long-run 
disparity in private investment is explained by the per capita income only. Finally, the results 
on short-run causality through Block Exogeneity Wald test evidenced that the short-run 
disparity in wage rate is caused by private investment and per capita income. In the short-run, 
there is a bidirectional causality between private investment and income and two 
unidirectional relationships run from private investment to wage rate and income to wage 
rate. These short-run relationships are also revealed in the impulse response functions and 
VDC analysis.  
The main findings of this analysis suggest that private investment plays an important 
role in shaping the disparity in wage rate and income. The reduction in regional imbalances is 
crucial for the sustainability of high economic growth in India, which requires even allocation 
of private investment and lowering of wage gap. Mallick (2013a; 2013b; 2014; 2015) laid 
emphasis on human capital, productivity and infrastructure as the crucial locational factors 
for the inter-state allocation of private investment. Furthermore, better human capital and 
infrastructure can drive up economic growth directly by serving as inputs in production and, 
indirectly, by promoting innovations and attracting private investment. Further, they help in 
reducing income inequalities across different sections of people within a state as well (Besley 
et al., 2013). Labour productivity also determines the wage rate in the Indian manufacturing 
sector (Sidhu, 2008). Skilled labour is the cause of the disparity in productivity and hence the 
wage rate in the manufacturing sector in India (Ramaswamy, 2008; Amiri, 2011). The shift in 
aggregate demand in favour of skilled-labour leads to an increase in wage disparity in this 
sector. The literatures established that variation in wage inequality is also associated with 
human capital, skill levels, occupational structure, skill-biased technical change and job 
polarization.  
Hence, central and state governments are required to take the practical measures such 
as development of infrastructure and human capital in the poor states to ensure fair allocation 
of private investment (Mallick, 2015c), and to provide training to improve the skills of the 
low-wage labourers to catch up with skilled labourers. Hence, the augmentation of health and 
education levels to increase labour productivity in low performing states is essential. To 
ensure this, well-directed social programmes focused on enhancing the health and education 
of the labour force, especially in rural areas of the backward states, are required. Various 
initiatives, such as the recent ―Skill Development Programme‖8, are being taken by the Indian 
government but it matters more to implement them effectively. In these programmes, special 
considerations should be given to the rural labour force in the backward states, which will 
reduce the wage gap across the states. However, the central government distributes public 
resources among states through standard formulae, which is intermediated by the Finance 
Commission to maintain equity. In addition, the central government distributes various 
discretionary schemes, which are mainly determined by the political equations of the central 
government with the individual states.  
The current Finance Commission has recommended a new approach of ‗cooperative 
federalism‘ in consultation with the states to reduce regional disparities and foster economic 
growth
9
. However, its success relies on the design and implementation of policies by state 
and local administrations, which should emphasise the above aspects. In particular, a higher 
share of resources should be allocated to states that have low quality of human capital, high 
proportion of unskilled labour and poor infrastructure.   
The findings provide scope for important policy initiatives to reduce wage and income 
inequalities across the Indian states. The present paper contributes to the existing studies at 
the state level in a number of ways. Primarily, the present paper is the first in kind to study 
the issue in the context of the manufacturing sector in the Indian states. This study adds to our 
understanding of the relationship between private investment, income and wage rate from a 
regional perspective. Secondly, this study suggests necessary policy recommendations that 
could stem the increasing disparity in economic development across regions. Furthermore, 
the detailed analysis by considering one important sub-sector of the manufacturing industries 
would probably give more insight into the relationship between private investment, wage rate 
and income. 
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For the detail of skill India Programme, see http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=123296 . 
9
The recommended approach involves a significant increase in the fiscal devolution to states from 31.54% to 42%, 
reduction in fragmentation of fiscal transfers, and providing states with larger fiscal space to plan and spend based on 
their needs and priorities. 
Appendices 
 
A1. Estimation of private investment in Indian States 
The study uses the methodology of CSO in defining investment. Investment is measured as the GFCF, 
which comprises construction, machinery equipment and computer software equipment (CSO, 2007). 
The study uses both the plant level data of ASI and the aggregate data of the NAS. Plant level data of 
ASI provides information on various blocks. A block provides PSL No., industry code, description of 
industry, state code, district code, sector code (i.e. rural and urban) code and the number of units. The 
PSL No., and industry code are used for the identification of the sample. Block B provides 
information on the ownership, which categorises all the units by the ownership. There are 6 types of 
ownerships, i.e. (1) wholly Central Government, (2) wholly State and/or Local Govt, (3) Central 
Government and State and/or Local Government jointly, (4) joint sector public, (5) joint sector 
private,  (6) wholly private ownership. The joint sector private and wholly private ownership are 
considered as private ownership, while the other four are in the category of public sector ownership, 
as defined by the NAS.  
The indicators related to GFCF are provided in the Block C of unit level data. Block C 
provides data on net value of fixed asset (closing as on), net value of fixed asset (opening as on), 
additions during the year due to revaluation and depreciation provided during the year by types of 
assets, i.e., land, building, plant and machinery, transport equipment, computer equipment including 
software, pollution control equipment and others. As per CSO (2007), the GFCF is measured as the 
net fixed capital formation (NFCF) plus the depreciation. The NFCF is net value of fixed asset 
(closing as on) – net value of fixed asset (opening as on) – addition during the year due to revaluation. 
Hence, the GFCF is equal to net value of fixed asset (closing as on) – net value of fixed asset (opening 
as on)-addition during the year due to revaluation plus depreciation provided during the year. Further, 
except land, all other assets are considered as capital creating assets (CSO, 2007).   
The information in Blocks A, B and C are combined over the years from 1993–94 to 2007–08 
to give data on indicators related to GFCF, types of ownerships, types of industries, states, etc., at the 
enterprise level. First, private enterprises at the state level are picked from the data. Then the above 
methodology is used to estimate the private GFCF for all the enterprise at the state level. The 
indicators related to GFCF in the unit level data are at current prices. Hence, the estimated GFCF is 
also at current prices. There are various limitations including the coverage in the unit level data. The 
NAS provides the aggregate of GFCF for the private sector in India. Hence, the national private 
GFCF at constant prices (2004–05=100) is distributed over the states on the basis of their share by 
using the estimated private GFCF from the unit level data of ASI. 
 
Table A2: Averages of income, wage rate, employment and private investment 
Years LC (in '0') GSDP PRI 
1993 4470 1420 586 
1994 4610 1633 592 
1995 4980 1658 998 
1996 4970 1730 1327 
1997 5430 1872 1457 
1998 5420 1886 1512 
1999 5810 1897 1398 
2000 6550 1730 899 
2001 6660 1683 1086 
2002 6770 1930 1175 
2003 6860 2078 1218 
2004 6240 2351 2153 
2005 6430 2490 3474 
2006 6530 2822 4337 
2007 9300 3086 5644 
 
Table A3: Descriptive statistics 
 LGSDP LLC LPRI 
 Mean  7.29  10.95  6.76 
 Median  7.34  10.93  6.80 
 Maximum  9.03  12.15  9.78 
 Minimum  3.98  10.16  1.95 
 Std. Dev.  0.92  0.35  1.41 
 Observations  300  300  300 
 
Table A4: Johansen Fisher panel cointegration test# 
No. of CEs Fisher Stat*(From Trace test) Fisher Stat*(From Max-eigen test) 
None  180.6 * 159.3* 
At most one 62.36** 58.22** 
At most two 49.03 49.03 
Note: * significant at 1% level. #Probabilities are computed using asymptotic chi‐square distribution. 
Source: Author‘s calculation using EViews 8. 
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